Who Made the Munich Agreement

From 1935, Poland established a secret Polish organization in the Zaolzie region. [68] In the summer of 1938, Poland attempted to organize guerrilla groups in the region. [68] On September 21, Poland formally requested a direct transfer of the territory to its own control. [69] This was accompanied by the formation of the army along the Czechoslovak border on September 23 and 24 and the order given to the so-called “combat units” of the Zaolzie Poles and the “Zaolzie Legion,” a paramilitary organization subordinate to the army command and composed of volunteers from all over Poland, to cross the border into Czechoslovakia and attack Czechoslovak units. [68] However, they were repulsed by Czechoslovak troops and withdrew to Poland. [68] September 29 and 30. In September 1938, an emergency meeting of the major European powers is held in Munich, excluding Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, allied with France and Czechoslovakia. On Hitler`s terms, an agreement was quickly reached. It was signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Britain and Italy. Militarily, the Sudetenland was of strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defenses were located there to protect themselves from a German attack. The agreement between the four powers was signed in the context of an undeclared german-Czechoslovak war of low intensity, which had begun on September 17, 1938. Meanwhile, after September 23, 1938, Poland moved its army units to its common border with Czechoslovakia.

[2] Czechoslovakia yielded to diplomatic pressure from France and Britain and agreed on 30 September to cede territories to Germany on Munich terms. Fearing the possible loss of Zaolzie to Germany, Poland issued Zaolzie with an ultimatum with a majority of ethnic Poles that Germany had accepted in advance and that Czechoslovakia had accepted on 1 October. [3] After a year of withdrawal from front-line politics, Daladier returned to the public vanguard in October 1934 and adopted a populist line against the banking oligarchy that he believed had taken control of French Democracy: the two hundred families. He was appointed president of the Radical Socialist Party and brought the party into the Popular Front coalition. Daladier became Minister of Defense in the Léon Blum government and held the decisive portfolio for two years. On the 28th. At 10.m 00 a.m., four hours before the deadline and without Czechoslovakia`s approval of Hitler`s request, the British ambassador to Italy, Lord Perth, summoned Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano to request an urgent meeting. [37] Perth told Ciano that Chamberlain had asked him to ask Mussolini to enter into negotiations and urge Hitler to postpone the ultimatum. [37] At 11:00.m., Ciano met Mussolini and informed him of Chamberlain`s proposal; Mussolini agreed and responded by calling the Italian ambassador to Germany and telling him: “Go immediately to the Führer and tell him that whatever happens, I will be at his side, but that I ask for a delay of twenty-four hours before the start of hostilities. In the meantime, I`ll explore what can be done to fix the problem. [40] Hitler received Mussolini`s message during a conversation with the French ambassador.

Hitler told the ambassador: “My good friend, Benito Mussolini, asked me to postpone the marching orders of the German army by twenty-four hours, and I agreed. Of course, this was not a concession, as the date of the invasion was set for October 1, 1938. [41] Addressing Chamberlain, Lord Perth Chamberlain thanked Mussolini and Chamberlain for asking Mussolini to attend a conference of the four powers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy in Munich on September 29 to resolve the Sudetenland problem before the deadline of 2:00.m p.m. Mussolini agreed. [41] Hitler`s only demand was to ensure that Mussolini was included in the conference negotiations. [41] As U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt learned that the conference was planned, he telegraphed Chamberlain, “Good Man.” [42] It is strange to think that this sudden return to the arts of obscuration and oppression comes at a time when the growth of democratic ideas and the triumphs of invention seemed to spread the General Enlightenment. President Wilson, inventing formulations that led to such unfortunate results, spoke at the peace conference of open alliances that were made openly, thinking that justice and the peace of success were assured when people lived in broad daylight. When Bridges wrote his beauty testament, he thought Wireless had made a war much less likely. He argued that “the voice drowned in truth, enveloped by the speed of light,” would spread over land and sea, [silently] An agreement signed at the Munich Conference in September 1938 ceded the German-speaking Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany. The agreement was concluded between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France.

Czechoslovakia was not allowed to participate in the conference. In March 1939, six months after the munich accords were signed, Hitler violated the agreement and destroyed the Czech state. At the Anglo-French summit on 28 and 29 April 1938, Chamberlain urged Daladier to abandon the alliance with Czechoslovakia, but was firmly informed that the France would respect its commitments that had forced the British to reluctantly get involved in the Sudeten crisis. The summit from 28 to 29. April 1938 represented a British “capitulation” to the French rather than a French “capitulation” to the British, Daladier having made it clear that the France would not abandon its alliance with Czechoslovakia. [10] On September 29, Britain and France reached an agreement with Hitler at a conference in Munich. Neville Chamberlain (Great Britain) and Edward Daladier (France) agreed with most of Hitler`s demands, leaving it to Czechoslovakia to accept Germany or fight it alone. Czechoslovakia gave in to Hitler`s demands. Six months later (March 1939), Hitler broke all his promises and seized the rest of Czechoslovakia.

“Czechoslovakia decided on September 30 to accept all the Munich conditions. On the morning of September 30, Beneš turned desperately to the Soviet ambassador. “Czechoslovakia is faced with the choice of starting a war with Germany, against it Britain and France. or to capitulate to the aggressor.” What would be the attitude of the USSR to these two possibilities, “that is, to continue the struggle or capitulation”? Before the Soviet government could discuss the issue, another telegram told them that no answer was required: “The Czechoslovak government has already decided to accept all the conditions.” It is hard to believe that the investigation was conducted seriously. Beneš remained true to his determination that Czechoslovakia should not fight alone or with Soviet Russia as its only ally. Years later, in 1944, he claimed that the Polish threat to Tesin had given him the final impetus to surrender; If that was the case, it was just a push in the direction he had decided to go. Beneš still believed – rightly, as it turned out – that Hitler would surpass himself; But the process took longer than he had hoped. .